


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30 January 1973

*Work copy -
H. Stoen*

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Walters
Dr. Proctor
Mr. Duckett

SUBJECT: SALT Staff Draft of "SALT Monitoring Study"
Requested by Dr. Kissinger

1. Dr. Kissinger has directed the Verification Panel Working Group to prepare a study of SALT monitoring which will define the roles and relationships of SALT-related organizations, set forth procedures, and establish a decision-making process. The Working Group has not yet begun work on such a paper. The NSC staff has indicated that CIA might be asked to write the initial draft. We have prepared the attached study as a draft response to Dr. Kissinger's directive. One possible use would be to make it available informally to the NSC staff prior to an official call for a CIA contribution.


2. We ask that you review this draft to determine whether, in your judgment, it strikes an appropriate balance between CIA's legitimate interest in reporting facts and interpretations and the NSC staff's legitimate interest in protecting White House prerogatives with respect to decision-making. The text is agreed within the Agency except for those parts which have been bracketed. These differences all derive from differing views about who should identify a particular Soviet action as a "possible violation," and who should determine whether in the US view a "violation" has occurred. You may wish to make a CIA recommendation on these questions by modifying this paper before it leaves the Agency.

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Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11652, Disruption
Category: 5B (1), (2), (3) & (4)

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IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

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-2-

3. We would welcome your concurrence or changes, as well as your decision on the unresolved questions, by Friday, 2 February if possible.

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Howard Stoertz, J.P. ✓
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Strategic Arms Limitations

Attachments:

- 1 - Draft Study
- 2 - Dr. Kissinger's Request for Study of Monitoring
- 3 - USIB Steering Group Terms of Reference
- 4 - Memorandum from Dr. Kissinger on Verification Panel
- 5 - NSDM 198
- 6 - Agreed Interpretation K of the Interim Agreement
- 7 - Article XIII of the ABM Treaty

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
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SUBJECT: SALT Staff Draft of "SALT Monitoring Study"
Requested by Dr. Kissinger

Distribution: addressees plus
Mr. Clarke, OSR



OSR
(3 copies for DDS&T)

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D-R-A-F-T
30 January 1973

The bracketed portions of our text represent alternative solutions to two related questions: who should identify a particular Soviet action as a possible violation, and who should determine whether in the US view a violation has in fact occurred. CIA recommends that the USIB Steering Group be authorized to identify and investigate possible violations. This would be consistent with the normal intelligence function of reporting both facts and interpretations, and would reflect the high probability that it would be through intelligence channels that other officials concerned with SALT would first be made aware that the possibility of a violation existed. We fully recognize, however, that it is not the responsibility of intelligence alone to judge the adequacy of the evidence or to interpret the meaning of treaty provisions, and thus to make a determination that in the US view a violation has in fact occurred. This determination could be made a responsibility of the Verification Panel or could be reserved for Presidential decision.

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SA/SAL - 98/72
29 December 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Member, Verification Panel Working Group

SUBJECT: VPWG Study of SALT Monitoring

REFERENCE: Dr. Kissinger's Memorandum dated December 26, 1972
(Executive Registry No. 72-6554)

Carl —

1. I will be on leave next week, and want to share some ideas with you in case there is some initial action on Dr. Kissinger's request while I am away.

2. It seems to me that there are some responsibilities with reference to monitoring and the SCC which are uniquely intelligence responsibilities. They are:

a. Supervising the monitoring operation and reporting the findings. The DCI has set up the USIB Steering Group as the mechanism to do this. It is done in such a way that all intelligence components with competence in the field participate. Non-intelligence organizations--like ACDA and JCS--should not participate in preparing the intelligence reports. The Verification Panel or its Working Group would seem a logical forum for reviewing such reports, assessing possible violations, and preparing materials for the President and/or the SCC. But the right of the DCI to advise the President directly on intelligence matters is a statutory responsibility which must be preserved.

b. Protecting intelligence sources and methods. This, too, is a statutory responsibility of the DCI. It means that intelligence must participate in the preparation of materials for use by the SCC, and must have a veto over what intelligence information can be released to the Russians. The intelligence advisor to the US component of the SCC can help carry out this responsibility, but if materials for use by the SCC are to be prepared by the Verification Panel or its Working Group, the CIA representatives will have to exercise this responsibility in that forum as well.

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SA/SAL - 98/72

SUBJECT: VPWG Study of SALT Monitoring

3. Beyond the foregoing, I do not see that it should make very much difference to us how the roles of the various groups are sliced up, or what decisions are made about the forum for handling information, assessing possible violations, and presenting information and alternatives to the NSC and the President. It would be in CIA's interest, I think, to advocate procedures which would minimize the additional processing of intelligence findings which would be required once the USIB Steering Group had released a routine or non-routine monitoring report. As it stands now, the Steering Group's reports are fully coordinated within the intelligence community. As finished intelligence, they should be appropriate for delivery without further alteration to the Verification Panel, the VPWG, or the President. They could form the basis for memoranda by the Verification Panel or VPWG assessing the significance of a possible violation and recommending action, or could serve as annexes to such memoranda.

4. As to intelligence participation on the US component of the SCC, the SALT experience should serve as a useful precedent. CIA's responsibilities to the SALT Delegation have included, among other things: current intelligence support to keep the delegates up-to-date on pertinent developments; intelligence reference service to provide information, analysis, and estimates on relevant aspects of the strategic situation; participation in the preparation of statements arguing the US case; participation in the analysis of Soviet positions; advising on the releasability of intelligence information to the Russians. I believe that CIA should have an advisor or advisors with the US component of the SCC to perform the above functions. When SCC meetings coincide with SALT negotiations, and assuming that the offices of the two groups are co-located, CIA support to both could most efficiently be provided by the SALT advisory team, perhaps expanded by one additional officer. When meetings do not coincide, a separate support team of one or two officers would be required to support the US component of the SCC.



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Howard Stoertz, Jr.
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Strategic Arms Limitations

SA/SAL - 98/72

SUBJECT: VPWG Study of SALT Monitoring

Distribution:

Orig - Mr. Duckett

1 - Dr. Proctor

1 - Mr. Clarke

1 - [REDACTED]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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December 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Study of SALT Monitoring

With the SALT agreements in effect it is vital that the roles of the USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations, the Verification Panel, and the U. S. component of the Standing Consultative Commission in monitoring the agreements be defined, their relation to each other be clear, the procedures which will be used carefully set forth, and the decision making process established.

Accordingly I am directing the Working Group to study these various elements and to recommend to the Verification Panel the following:


1. The roles of each of the groups.
- ✓ 2. The manner in which routine and non-routine information will be handled, prior to any notification of the President.
- ✓ 3. The level at which any preliminary assessment of a possible violation will be made.
- ✓ 4. How information and alternatives will be presented to the NSC and the President.

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In the interim, the Verification Panel will make any preliminary evaluations of possible violations. Any information of interest regarding Soviet actions should be brought to the attention of the Verification Panel in a timely manner.


Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Director, Office of
Science and Technology
The Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission

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DRAFT: H.S.

15 January 1973

Issue recommended for DCI attention:

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN SALT VERIFICATION

Should Intelligence make independent judgments about whether or not the Soviets are complying with the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement?

There is general agreement that the Intelligence Community is responsible for monitoring the Soviet forces limited by the agreements and reporting its findings, while the Verification Panel of the NSC is responsible for verifying Soviet compliance or non-compliance with the terms of the agreements. This division of responsibilities allows representatives of the policy agencies of government, who are on the Verification Panel along with the DCI, to participate in judging the adequacy of the intelligence available on Soviet compliance, and in interpreting the meaning of the provisions of the agreements. It also protects the Intelligence Community, which is necessarily dealing with incomplete information, from being committed to guaranteeing that the Soviets are complying.

This division of responsibility can give rise to problems in the event that Intelligence detects what it considers to be a Soviet violation.

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Members of White House staff have informally but forcefully expressed their view that Intelligence should make no judgment that a violation has occurred, but should limit themselves to reporting the facts. Carried to an extreme, this view could abridge the right and responsibility of the DCI independently to communicate his findings and his interpretation of their significance to the President and other officials of government.

Intelligence has not detected any Soviet action which we consider to be clearly in violation of the SALT agreements, so the problem has not yet arisen in practice. It may arise in theory, however, as we and other participants on the Verification Panel Working Group respond to a recent directive from Dr. Kissinger calling for a study of the roles of the USIB SALT Steering Group, the Verification Panel, and the US component of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission.

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Issues for Decision

Levels of Decision-Making

SALT Staff

Clarke

Steering Group:

"identifies what it considers to be a possible violation or ambiguous situation"

a) develops information regarding Soviet activities in those areas covered by the Treaty or agreement
b) identifies what it considers to be an area of potential concern

Verification Panel:

"determines whether a particular Soviet activity constitutes a violation"

determines whether a particular Soviet activity should be considered as a possible violation

NSC Staff & President:

decision as to response and means of implementation

in effect, determines whether a particular Soviet activity constitutes a violation and determines response and means of implementation

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WHAT INTELLIGENCE THINKS IT SHOULD BE DOING IN MONITORING

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C. DCI Letter Establishing USIB Steering Group
D. Steering Group Terms of Reference
E. Intelligence Directorate Objectives
F. Stoertz Memo Setting Up Intelligence Community
Organization for SALT

HOW PEOPLE HAVE GONE ABOUT MONITORING

- 25X1 G. DCI Memorandum to Kissinger Covering Plesetsk Paper
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25X1 J. CIB on []
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REQUIREMENTS PERTINENT ONLY TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE

- L. Tasks for Monitoring Compliance with the ABM Treaty:
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13 February 1973

RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES FOR SALT
MONITORING, VERIFICATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION

I. General Considerations

The roles of the organizations and the procedures involved in SALT monitoring, verification, and implementation can be analyzed in the context of the following sequence of tasks: (1) monitoring Soviet territory, forces, and activities affected by the terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Offensive Agreement; (2) identifying and investigating problems, ambiguous situations, and possible violations; (3) identifying alternative courses of action and preparing recommendations for NSC consideration and Presidential decision; and (4) implementing the decisions taken.

The Verification Panel has the central role in this process. It is the mechanism for bringing together and analyzing relevant policy and intelligence considerations and for formulating alternatives for decision. The other groups principally involved are the USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations and the US component of the Standing Consultative Commission.*

All decisions with respect to [the US response to] a Soviet violation or an ambiguous situation will be made by the President.

To preserve the President's options in this very sensitive aspect of US-Soviet relations, special care must be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosure of matters related to SALT monitoring even within the Executive

* See attachment 2.

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Branch. Also, US security information as well as US intelligence sources and methods must be protected in the presentation of materials to the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission.

II. Roles and Procedures

The USIB Steering Group: The role of the USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations is to focus the collection and analytical resources of the intelligence community on SALT monitoring problems.

The Steering Group was established by the Director of Central Intelligence and is responsible to him for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the SALT agreements. The Steering Group is chaired by the Deputy Director of CIA and its members are the Director of DIA; the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA. The SALT Monitoring Working Group, a subordinate body established by the Steering Group, includes representatives from the foregoing agencies and other active participants representing those parts of the intelligence community having responsibility for collecting and analyzing SALT-related information.



Specific responsibilities assigned to the Steering Group include the following: *

- a. the preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance;

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* See attachment 3.

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b. the investigation of [possible treaty violations or other anomalies] [developments of potential concern]; *

c. the preparation of intelligence materials for possible use in discussions with Soviet representatives in the Standing Consultative Commission.

At intervals of about three times a year, the Steering Group routinely prepares a "SALT Monitoring Report." These reports summarize the status of intelligence coverage for monitoring and the status of Soviet forces and activities affected by the agreements. They may also discuss developments of potential concern. These reports are forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Chairman of the Verification Panel. Additional distribution is limited to members of the Verification Panel and other officials directly concerned with SALT monitoring and negotiation.

When the Steering Group identifies what it considers to be [an instance of possible Soviet non-compliance or an ambiguous situation] [a development of potential concern] requiring investigation, or is directed to investigate such a case, it will prepare a non-routine report reviewing the intelligence evidence and analysis. The USIB Steering Group investigation will not consider the desirability of raising the matter with the Soviets; it will consider the feasibility of raising it without compromising sensitive intelligence sources and methods. This report will be forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Chairman of the Verification Panel only.

The Verification Panel: The role of the Verification Panel is to bring to bear on SALT matters the views of the senior officials responsible for formulating policy and for intelligence regarding SALT, and to make recommendations for NSC consideration and Presidential decision. **

* Choice of the second alternative would require a change in the Terms of Reference of the Steering Group.

** See attachment 4.

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The Panel is chaired by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Its members are the Undersecretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission also participates. The Verification Panel Working Group, a subordinate body established by the Panel, is chaired by a member of the NSC staff. Its members include the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis; the Assistant Director for Science and Technology, ACDA; the Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State; the representative of AC/SAN, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA.

The Verification Panel will receive routine monitoring reports prepared by the USIB Steering Group. Any member of the Verification Panel may request the Panel Chairman to direct the USIB Steering Group to investigate [an instance of possible Soviet non-compliance or an ambiguous situation] [a development of potential concern].

The Chairman of the Verification Panel may direct the Panel to study an instance of possible Soviet non-compliance or an ambiguous situation and to make recommendations for Presidential decision. He may initiate such a study on the basis of routine or non-routine reporting by the USIB Steering Group or for other reasons which in his judgment warrant it.

The study will normally be drafted by the Verification Panel Working Group. It should include consideration of the intelligence evidence and its adequacy, the US interpretation of the terms of the agreements, the

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significance for US security, alternative courses of action open to the US and the impact of these alternatives on US programs, and the potential advantage to the US of raising the matter with the Soviets.

On the basis of this study, the Verification Panel should determine whether the situation warrants bringing the matter to the attention of the President for his decision as to the desirability of raising it with the Soviets. In making its recommendations, the Verification Panel should include consideration of whether it is in the US interest to raise the matter in a regular session of the Standing Consultative Commission, to convene a session for the purpose, or to use other channels.

The Verification Panel also directs the activity of the US component of the Standing Consultative Commission. The Verification Panel Working Group will provide support in Washington for the US component of the Commission as necessary.

The Standing Consultative Commission: The role of the US component of the SCC is to negotiate with the Soviets on matters concerning implementation of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement. The US component will implement Presidential instructions under the direction of the Verification Panel.

The US component will consist of a Commissioner and a Deputy to be appointed by the President. A US staff will be formed to support the Commissioner and will include an Executive Secretary and members designated by the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. *

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In addition to considering questions concerning compliance with the provisions of the agreements, the SCC is charged with developing agreed procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the ABM Treaty, and for dismantling or destruction of older types of ICBM launchers and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers, as well as procedures for timely notification thereof, under the Interim Agreement. The SCC is also to consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; to consider possible changes in the strategic situation bearing on the provisions of the agreements; and to provide voluntarily such information as either side considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. *

The US Commissioner on the SCC and his Deputy will receive routine monitoring reports prepared by the USIB Steering Group. Either may request the Chairman of the Verification Panel to direct the Steering Group to investigate [an instance of possible Soviet non-compliance or an ambiguous situation] [a development of potential concern].

In preparing the necessary materials for presentation to the Soviets under both routine and non-routine conditions, the US component of the SCC will draw upon the available studies of the Verification Panel and may request or receive supplementary studies/^{and guidance}from the Verification Panel Working Group. Intelligence materials necessary for use in such

* See attachments 6 and 7.

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presentations will be prepared initially by the USIB Steering Group. Before presentation to the Soviets, negotiating materials will be reviewed and cleared by the Verification Panel Working Group and, if necessary, by the Verification Panel.

In the day-to-day work of the US component of the SCC in negotiating with the Soviets, the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence on the staff of the US component will be responsible for providing such additional guidance and approval as may be necessary to ensure the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. The representative of the Secretary of Defense will have similar responsibilities for the protection of US security information.

III. Urgent Situations

When an urgent development arises involving Soviet forces or activities covered by the Treaty or the Agreement and potentially affecting the national security, the President and the Chairman of the Verification Panel will be alerted by the Director of Central Intelligence.

In urgent situations, procedures by-passing various steps in the process described in Part II of this paper may be necessary.

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WASHINGTON

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December 26, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Study of SALT Monitoring

With the SALT agreements in effect it is vital that the roles of the USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations, the Verification Panel, and the U. S. component of the Standing Consultative Commission in monitoring the agreements be defined, their relation to each other be clear, the procedures which will be used carefully set forth, and the decision making process established.

Accordingly I am directing the Working Group to study these various elements and to recommend to the Verification Panel the following:

1. The roles of each of the groups.
2. The manner in which routine and non-routine information will be handled, prior to any notification of the President.
3. The level at which any preliminary assessment of a possible violation will be made.
4. How information and alternatives will be presented to the NSC and the President.


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In the interim, the Verification Panel will make any preliminary evaluations of possible violations. Any information of interest regarding Soviet actions should be brought to the attention of the Verification Panel in a timely manner.


Henry A. Kissinger.

cc: The Director, Office of
Science and Technology
The Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission

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27 June 1972

Limited Distribution

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR USIB STEERING GROUP ON
MONITORING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

1. The USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations (hereafter referred to as the SALT Steering Group) will be chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, with the following members: the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

2. The SALT Steering Group will be responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.

3. Specifically the responsibilities of the SALT Steering Group include (but are not limited to) the following:

- a. the review of relevant schedules and procedures for monitoring;
- b. the evaluation of the effectiveness of intelligence coverage and analysis for monitoring;
- c. the preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance;
- d. the investigation of possible treaty violations or other anomalies;
- e. the preparation of intelligence materials for possible use in discussions with Soviet representatives in the Standing Consultative Commission;
- f. the preparation of recommendations for the Director of Central Intelligence.

Attachment
USIB-D-27.5/5
27 June 1972
Limited Distribution

4. The SALT Steering Group will function primarily as a supervisory rather than an operating entity and will make maximum use of existing community assets and procedures to carry out its work expeditiously. To this end, it may task existing USIB committees or establish such working groups as the Chairman deems necessary. With respect to those intelligence ~~community components over which Steering Group members do not already have~~ command authority, the Steering Group is authorized to levy requirements and assign priorities as necessary, in coordination with the head of the component concerned.

5. The Central Intelligence Agency will provide the secretariat for the Chairman.

6. Should unreconcilable differences on important matters of procedure or substance arise within the SALT Steering Group, they will be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence for decision. Unreconcilable differences on important matters of substance will be clearly set forth and identified as to origin in any report forwarded by the SALT Steering Group.

7. The SALT Steering Group will report to the Director of Central Intelligence and, through him, to the NSC and other designated officials concerned with the monitoring problem. The State and DIA members of the SALT Steering Group (and their representatives) will continue to support their respective departmental representatives in the Executive Branch coordination process.

THE WHITE HOUSE
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WASHINGTON

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October 24, 1969

DDI-3026-69

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
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR, ACDA

SUBJECT: Procedures and Schedule for SALT Preparations

The President on October 23 directed that the following procedures be observed in connection with preparations for the opening of SALT talks:

1. There will be an NSC meeting shortly after November 3. At this meeting basic options to be advanced to the Soviets will be reviewed.
2. Shortly following the NSC meeting, the President will issue a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) which will constitute his instruction to our SALT delegation.
3. The Verification Panel will continue to function permanently to undertake the substantive analytical work on issues requiring NSC consideration and Presidential decision. The SALT Backstopping Committee functions on a permanent basis, under the Under Secretaries Committee, to provide day-to-day support for the SALT negotiations.
4. Based on the NSDM referred to above, the SALT Backstopping Committee should prepare our position and tactics for the opening phase of the talks. A new round of NATO consultations should be scheduled to begin in the week before the opening of talks with the Soviets and should continue thereafter as required.



Henry A. Kissinger

Copies to: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
✓ Director of Central Intelligence

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CONFIDENTIAL

Attachment 5
November 18, 1972

National Security Decision Memorandum 198


DDI-3125-7.3

TO: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: SALT Standing Consultative Commission

The President has approved the following guidance for the formation of the U.S. portion of the Standing Consultative Commission to be established under the Provisions of Article XIII of the ABM Treaty:

- A. The U.S. portion of the Commission will consist of a Commissioner and a Deputy to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the addressees.
- B. The Commissioner and his Deputy will not serve on the U.S. SALT Delegation, but they will maintain liaison with that Delegation through their Executive Secretary.
- C. A U.S. Staff will be formed to support the U.S. portion of the Commission. This staff will be headed by the Executive Secretary and will include members as designated by the addressees to the Commissioner.
- D. Until the permanent Commissioner is appointed, negotiations for establishing the Commission will be conducted by the U.S. SALT Delegation, and the Chief of the U.S. Delegation will act as the U.S. Commissioner in both substantive and administrative matters.
- E. The Commission will operate under the direction of the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel Working Group will monitor the implementation of the agreements and will provide support in Washington for the Commission as necessary.


Henry A. Kissinger

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Attachment 7

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.



ESTIMATIVE TERMS and DEGREES OF PROBABILITY

The table below explains the terms most frequently used to describe the range of likelihood in the key judgements of this estimate.

Order of Likelihood	Synonyms	Chances in 10	Per Cent
Near Certainty	virtually (almost) certain we are convinced, highly probable, highly likely	9	99
			90
Probable	likely we believe we estimate chances are good it is probable that	8 7	
		6	60
Even Chance	chances are slightly better than even chances are about even chances are slightly less than even	5	
		4	40
Improbable	probably not unlikely we believe ... not	3 2	
			10
Near Impossibility	almost impossible only a slight chance highly doubtful	1	1

NOTE: Words such as "perhaps", "may", and "might" will be used to describe situations in the lower ranges of likelihood. The word "possible", when used without further modification, will generally be used only when a judgement is important but cannot be given an order of likelihood with any degree of precision.

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The case for consistent, unambiguous usage of a few key odds expressions.

WORDS OF ESTIMATIVE PROBABILITY

Sherman Kent

The briefing officer was reporting a photo reconnaissance mission.¹ Pointing to the map, he made three statements:

1. "And at this location there is a new airfield. [He could have located it to the second on a larger map.] Its longest runway is 10,000 feet."
2. "It is almost certainly a military airfield."
3. "The terrain is such that the Blanks could easily lengthen the runways, otherwise improve the facilities, and incorporate this field into their system of strategic staging bases. It is *possible* that they will." Or, more daringly, "It would be logical for them to do this and *sooner or later they probably will.*"

The above are typical of three kinds of statements which populate the literature of all substantive intelligence. The first is as close as one can come to a statement of indisputable fact. It describes something knowable and known with a high degree of certainty. The reconnaissance aircraft's position was known with precision and its camera reproduced almost exactly what was there.

Estimative Uncertainty

The second is a judgment or estimate. It describes something which is knowable in terms of the human understanding but not precisely known by the man who is talking about it. There is strong evidence to sustain his judgment: the only aircraft on the field are military aircraft, many are parked in revetted hard-stands, the support area has all the characteristics of similar known military installations, and so on. Convincing as it is, this evidence is circumstantial. It cannot justify a flat assertion that this is a military airfield. It makes the case, say, 90 percent of the way. And some sort of verbal qualifier

¹ This particular briefing officer was *not* the photo-interpreter. See page 61 for the special language of P/Is.

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is necessary to show that the case is a 90-percenter, not a 100. This is why the briefer said "*almost certainly*."

The third statement is another judgment or estimate, this one made almost without any evidence direct or indirect. It may be an estimate of something that no man alive can know, for the Blanks may not yet have made up their minds whether to lengthen the runways and build up the base. Still the logic of the situation as it appears to the briefer permits him to launch himself into the area of the literally unknowable and make this estimate. He can use *possible* to indicate that runway extension is neither certain nor impossible, or he can be bolder and use *probably* to designate more precisely a degree of likelihood, a lower one than he had attached to his estimate regarding the character of the airfield.

Generally speaking, the most important passages of the literature of substantive intelligence contain far more statements of the estimative types two and three than of the factual type one. This is the case because many of the things you most wish to know about the other man are the secrets of state he guards most jealously. To the extent his security measures work, to that extent your knowledge must be imperfect and your statements accordingly qualified by designators of your uncertainty. Simple prudence requires the qualifier in any type-three statement to show a decent reticence before the unknowable.

Concern over these qualifiers is most characteristic of that part of the intelligence production business known as estimates. This is no small recondite compartment; it extends to almost every corner of all intelligence research work, from the short appraisals or comments of a reports officer to the full-dress research study of the political or economic analyst. Practically all substantive intelligence people constantly make estimates. The remarks that follow are generally addressed to all these people and their readers, but most especially are they addressed to that particular institution of the estimating business known as the National Intelligence Estimate and its audience.

The NIE, taking into account the high echelon of its initiators, producers, and consumers, should be the community's best effort to deal with the relevant evidence imaginatively and judiciously. It should set forth the community's findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key statement. Ideally, once the commu-

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nity has made up its mind in this matter, it should be able to choose a word or a phrase which quite accurately describes the degree of its certainty; and ideally, exactly this message should get through to the reader.

It should not come as a surprise that the fact is far from the ideal, that considerable difficulty attends both the fitting of a phrase to the estimators' meaning and the extracting of that meaning by the consumer. Indeed, from the vantage point of almost fourteen years of experience, the difficulties seem practically insurmountable. The why and wherefore of this particular area of semantics is the subject of this essay.

Let me begin with a bit of history.²

Early Brush with Ambiguity

In March 1951 appeared NIE 29-51, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951." The following was its key judgment, made in the final paragraph of the Conclusions: "Although it is impossible to determine which course the Kremlin is likely to adopt, we believe that the extent of Satellite military and propaganda preparations indicates that an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 *should be considered a serious possibility*." (Emphasis added.) Clearly this statement is either of type two, a knowable thing of which our knowledge was very imperfect, or of type three, a thing literally unknowable for the reason that the Soviets themselves had not yet reached a binding decision. Whichever it was, our duty was to look hard at the situation, decide how likely or unlikely an attack might be, and having reached that decision, draft some language that would convey to the reader our exact judgment.

The process of producing NIEs then was almost identical to what it is today. This means that a draft had been prepared in the Office of National Estimates on the basis of written contributions from the IAC³ agencies, that a score or so of Soviet, Satellite, and Yugoslav experts from the intelligence community labored over it, and that an all but final text presided over by the Board of National Estimates had gone to the Intelligence Advisory Committee. There the IAC

² Harry H. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) carries on pp. 196-7 a bob-tailed and somewhat garbled version of it.

³ Intelligence Advisory Committee, USIB's predecessor.

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members, with the DCI in the chair, gave it its final review, revision, and approval.

As is quite obvious from the sentence quoted above, Soviet and Satellite intentions with respect to Yugoslavia were a matter of grave concern in the high policy echelons of our government. The State Department's Policy Planning Staff was probably the most important group seized of the problem. Its chairman and members read NIE 29-51 with the sort of concentration intelligence producers can only hope their product will command.

A few days after the estimate appeared, I was in informal conversation with the Policy Planning Staff's chairman. We spoke of Yugoslavia and the estimate. Suddenly he said, "By the way, what did you people mean by the expression 'serious possibility'? What kind of odds did you have in mind?" I told him that my personal estimate was on the dark side, namely that the odds were around 65 to 35 in favor of an attack. He was somewhat jolted by this; he and his colleagues had read "serious possibility" to mean odds very considerably lower. Understandably troubled by this want of communication, I began asking my own colleagues on the Board of National Estimates what odds they had had in mind when they agreed to that wording. It was another jolt to find that each Board member had had somewhat different odds in mind and the low man was thinking of about 20 to 80, the high of 80 to 20. The rest ranged in between.

Of my colleagues on the Board at least one—maybe more—shared my concern. My most obvious co-worrier was [redacted]. He and I were shaken perhaps more by the realization that Board members who had worked over the estimate had failed to communicate with each other than by the Board's failure to communicate with its audience. This NIE was, after all, the twenty-ninth that had appeared since General Smith had established the Office of National Estimates. Had Board members been seeming to agree on five month's worth of estimative judgments with no real agreement at all? Was this the case with all others who participated—ONE staffers and IAC representatives, and even IAC members themselves? Were the NIEs dotted with "serious possibilities" and other expressions that meant very dif-

25X1

[redacted], one of the original eight members of the Board of National Estimates, a lawyer by trade, and a gifted semanticist by avocation. Some will remember him for his elegant and precise writing; none will forget his eccentricities. He was the man who always wore his hat in the house.

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ferent things to both producers and readers? What were we really trying to say when we wrote a sentence such as this?

What we were trying to do was just what my Policy Planning friend had assumed, namely to quote odds on this or that being the case or taking place in the future. There is a language for odds; in fact there are two—the precise mathematical language of the actuary or the race track bookie and a less precise though useful verbal equivalent. We did not use the numbers, however, and it appeared that we were misusing the words.

The No-Odds Possible

Our gross error in the Yugoslav estimate, and perhaps in its predecessors, lay in our not having fully understood this particular part of our task. As Foster and I saw it the substantive stuff we had been dealing with had about it certain elements of dead certainty: Stalin was in charge in the USSR, for example. These, if relevant, we stated affirmatively or used impliedly as fact. There were also elements of sheer impossibility (Yugoslavia was not going to crack off along its borders and disappear physically from the face of the earth); these we did not bother to state at all. In between these matters of certainty and impossibility lay the large area of the *possible*. With respect to the elements herein we could perceive some that were more likely to happen than not, some less likely. These were the elements upon which we could make an estimate, choosing some word or phrase to convey our judgment that the odds were such and such for or against something coming to pass.

At the race track one might say:

There are ten horses in the starting gate. It is *possible* that any one of them will win—even the one with three legs.

But the *odds* (or chances) *against* the three-legger are overwhelming.

Here, as in estimating Yugoslav developments, there is evidence to justify the citing of odds. But in the world that intelligence estimates try hardest to penetrate—a world of closed covenants secretly arrived at, of national business conducted behind walls of all but impenetrable security, of skillfully planned deceptions, and so on—such evidence is by no means invariably at hand. In a multitude of the most important circumstances—situations you are duty bound to consider and report on—about all you can say is that such and such

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is *neither certain to happen nor is its happening an impossibility*. The short and proper way out is to say that its happening is *possible* and stop there without any expression of odds. If you reserve the use of "possible" for this special purpose—to signal something of high importance whose chances of being or happening you cannot estimate with greater precision—hopefully you will alert your reader to some necessary contingency planning. (You may not if you have dulled him by citing a lot of "possibles" of little real consequence.)

If our gross error lay in not perceiving the correctness—or at any rate the utility—of the above formulation, our particular error lay in using the word "possibility" with the modifier "serious." [] and I felt that it was going to be difficult enough for the estimators to communicate a sense of odds even if they stuck to a fairly rigorous vocabulary; it was going to be impossible if the vocabulary were permitted to become as sloppily imprecise as in normal speech. We had to have a way of differentiating between those possible things about which we could make a statement of likelihood and the other possible things about which we could not. The first cardinal rule to emerge was thus, "The word 'possible' (and its cognates⁵) must not be modified." The urge to drop into ordinary usage and write "just possible," "barely possible," "a distinct [or good] possibility," and so on must be suppressed. The whole concept of "possibility" as here developed must stand naked of verbal modifiers.⁶

⁵ See page 59.

⁶ This usage is wholly in accord with the findings of the lexicographers, who almost invariably assign it the number one position. Further, it is readily understood and generally employed by statisticians, scientists, and the like, who sometimes define it as "non-zero probability." This is much to my taste.

At the same time there can be no question of the existence of a second usage, especially in the ordinary spoken word. The meaning here is most emphatically not the broad range of "non-zero probability," but a variable low order of probability, say anywhere below 40 or 30 or 20 percent. Thus it would fall last in a series that named descending odds: certain, probable, possible. When people use it to signify very low odds, for example below 5 percent, they may say "remotely possible" or any of its many cognates. This of course is not to my liking, but the intended meaning is clear. The serious trouble comes when another group of users lifts the word out of its position in the cellar of odds and by the addition of augmenting adjectives makes it do duty upstairs: "serious possibility," "great possibility," "highly possible."

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An Odds Table

Once and I had decided upon this first cardinal rule we turned to the elements where likelihood *could* be estimated. We began to think in terms of a chart which would show the mathematical odds equivalent to words and phrases of probability. Our starter was a pretty complicated affair. We approached its construction from the wrong end. Namely, we began with 11 words or phrases which seemed to convey a feeling of 11 different orders of probability and then attached numerical odds to them. At once we perceived our folly. In the first place, given the inexactness of the intelligence data we were working with, the distinctions we made between one set of odds and its fellows above and below were unjustifiably sharp. And second, even if in rare cases you could arrive at such exact mathematical odds, the verbal equivalent could not possibly convey that exactness. The laudable precision would be lost on the reader.

So we tried again, this time with only five gradations, and beginning with the numerical odds. The chart which emerged can be set down in its classical simplicity thus:

100% Certainty			
The General Area of Possibility	93%,	give or take about 6%	Almost certain
	75%,	give or take about 12%	Probable
	50%,	give or take about 10%	Chances about even
	30%,	give or take about 10%	Probably not
	7%,	give or take about 5%	Almost certainly not
0% Impossibility			

Important note to consumers: You should be quite clear that when we say "such and such is unlikely" we mean that the chances of its NOT happening are in our judgment about three to one. Another, and to you critically important, way of saying the same thing is that the chances of its HAPPENING are about one in four. Thus if we were to write, "It is unlikely that Castro will attempt to shoot down a U-2 between now and November 1965," we mean there is in our view around a 25-percent chance that he will do just that. If the estimate were to read, "It is almost certain Castro will not . . .," we would mean there was still an appreciable chance, say five percent or less, that he would attempt the shoot-down.

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We had some charts run up and had some discussions in the community. There were those who thought the concept and the chart a very fine thing. A retired intelligence professional thought well enough of it to put it into a book.⁷ CIA officers, addressing War College audiences and the like, would sometimes flash a slide and talk about it. A few copies got pasted on the walls of estimates offices in the community. Some people were sufficiently taken that they advocated putting it on the inside back cover of every NIE as a sort of sure-fire handy glossary.

There were also those who did not think about the idea at all, and others in opposition to it. Some fairly important people who had a professional stake in this kind of thinking never took the trouble to learn what it was all about. A good many did take a little trouble and laughed. Still a third group found out all they needed to know and attacked the whole proposition from a hard semantic base point. Of these more later.

In the face of this inertia and opposition and with the early departure of my only solid ally, [] I began backing away from bold forward positions. I did continue harassing actions and in the course of making a nuisance of myself to associates and colleagues did pick up some useful converts, but I dropped all thought of getting an agreed air-tight vocabulary of estimative expressions, let alone reproducing the chart in the rear of every NIE. With the passage of time it has appeared that the guerrilla strategy thrust upon me by circumstance was the only one holding any chance of success. In almost fourteen years this article is my first serious and systematic attempt to get the message across, and it probably would not have been written if David Wark⁸ had not consulted me about his foray into the same semantic problem.

The Aesthetic Opposition

What slowed me up in the first instance was the firm and reasoned resistance of some of my colleagues. Quite figuratively I am going

⁷ Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production* (N.Y., 1957). The chart appears on the inside cover and again on page 208—not exactly as above but in full accord with my principles. The trouble comes on pp. 209–210, where General Platt departs widely, and to me regrettably, from my notion of legitimate synonyms.

⁸ See the next following article.

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to call them the "poets"—as opposed to the "mathematicians"—in my circle of associates, and if the term conveys a modicum of disapprobation on my part, that is what I want it to do. Their attitude toward the problem of communication seems to be fundamentally defeatist. They appear to believe the most a writer can achieve when working in a speculative area of human affairs is communication in only the broadest general sense. If he gets the wrong message across or no message at all—well, that is life.

Perhaps I overstate the poets' defeatism. In any case at least one of them feels quite strongly that my brief for the "mathematicians" is pretty much nonsense. He has said that my likening my side to the mathematician's is a phoney; that I am in fact one with the sociologists who try by artificial definitions to give language a bogus precision. He has gone on to stress the function of rhetoric and its importance. And he has been at some pains to point out how handy it would be to use expressions like "*just possible*," "*may well*," and "*doubtless*" as they are loosely used in conversation. Could there not be an occasional relaxation of the rule?

Suppose one wrote a sentence: "Khrushchev *may well* have had in the back of his mind such and such, or indeed it is *distinctly possible* that somebody had just primed him. . . ." Now suppose you delete the "*well*" and the "*distinctly*"; has anything been lost? There will be those who point out that "*may well*" and "*distinctly possible*" do convey a flavor which is missing without them. Of course the flavor in question is the flavor of odds, communicated without quoting them. The poets would probably argue that in a sentence of this sort the introduction of any of the terms for particular odds would make the writer look silly. Everybody knows that you could not have the evidence to sustain the use of, say, "*probably*" in these two instances. Hence you can only suggest odds by the use of the "*may well*" and "*distinctly possible*" and so say something without saying it, in short fudge it. The poets feel wounded when urged to delete the whole ambiguous sentence, arguing that this serves only to impoverish the product. They grow impatient when you advocate dropping only the "*well*" and the "*distinctly*." And as for your accusation of fudging, they generally counterattack, inviting you to write something that fudges nothing.

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There is a point which the poets can make with telling effect. It is that there are probably just as many reading poets as there are writing poets, and these are going to be numb to the intended meaning of the "mathematician" writer. If you write to give no more than just the general idea or general feel you may get through with great success. Per contra, if you break your heart in an endeavor to make yourself fully and precisely understood, you may not.

I realize the truth in the above; I am not reconciled; I deplore it.

The Growth of Variants

Even if there had been no poets it would have been an impractical idea to print a chart on the inside of the back page of each NIE as a sort of glossary. To have used the one on page 55 and stuck to these words exclusively would have imposed intolerable restraints upon the prose. Even if it had been desirable it would have been impossible to enforce such rigidity. But this was really never at issue: from the start a number of perfectly legitimate synonyms for the concept of possibility and a number for each of the five orders of likelihood were generally recognized.⁹

⁹ Some of these synonymous meanings are expressed in verb forms. Thus it is syntactically possible to use them closely coupled to one of the adverbial expressions of odds, e.g., "we believe it likely that . . ." or "we estimate it is almost certain that such and such will not . . ." If we really mean to assign an odds value to these verb forms good usage would forbid this kind of doubling-up. Mathematically, the probabilities would have to undergo a quite ridiculous multiplication. Thus "we believe" (75±percent) multiplied by "likely" (75±percent) would yield odds worse than 3 to 2 instead of 3 to 1. If we are not assigning an odds value to "we believe" and "we estimate," the purist would say we should not use them. Yet on many occasions a writer will feel uncomfortable—and justifiably so—with a bare "It is likely that . . ." Such a bald statement is seemingly more confident than the situation would warrant. The writer will feel something akin to a compulsion towards modesty and a drive to soften the "likely" by introducing it with a "we believe" or "we estimate." Almost invariably he does not intend to change the odds associated with "likely." If one could set himself up as the arbiter, one would, I believe, rule that the "likely," or the "probably," or the "almost certainly," etc. was the operative expression of odds and that its message was unaffected by the introducing verb.

Doubling up in the "possibly" category is a different matter. We should avoid "it might (or may) be possible for the Blanks to . . ." The verb should be present or future indicative, normally "is" and "will be."

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For example:

Possible ¹⁰	conceivable could ¹¹ may might perhaps ¹²
Almost certain	virtually certain all but certain highly probable highly likely odds [or chances] overwhelming
Probable	likely we believe we estimate
50-50	chances about even chances a little better [or less] than even
Probably not ¹³	improbable unlikely we believe that . . . not we estimate that . . . not we doubt, doubtful

¹⁰ These synonyms must not be modified; might *well*, could *well*, *just* could, *barely* conceivable, etc. are as inadmissible as the original sin.

¹¹ "Could" is included here because of many years' duty as a synonym for "possible." It has also served as a short way of noting a capability as in "The Soviets could develop [for "have the capability to develop"] such and such a radar though we have no evidence that they are doing so." The two usages are close, to be sure, but not identical.

¹² As in, "It is almost certain that such and such will occur in the delta, *perhaps* in Saigon itself."

¹³ This group of words poses at least one very vexing problem. Suppose you wish to make a positive estimate that there is, say, about a 30-percent chance that such and such thing is the case. Assuming that the thing in question is important, a 30-percent chance of its being the case is highly significant. If you stick with the chart and write "it is improbable [or unlikely etc.] that such and such is the case" you will probably convey a much more negative attitude than you intend. There are many ways around the problem; they will, however, require a few more words.

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Almost certainly not

{	almost impossible
	virtually impossible
	some slight chance
	highly doubtful

If the chart were expanded to take care of these, it probably would not fit on the inside back cover of the NIE, and even if it could be made to, its complexity would probably exasperate gentle reader more than it would edify him. Still worse, he would be confused by changes that would have to be made in it from time to time, always to accommodate newcomers among the accepted expressions.

The table of synonyms above did not come into being all at once; it has grown to its present size by accretion. "We believe" came in rather early, and as I remember via General Smith himself. "We estimate" was a bit later; "we think," "we expect," and "we judge" are part way in.¹⁴ If they make it all the way I trust they will be used and understood in the "probably"/"we believe" bracket. "We doubt" has been accepted within the last few years as a legitimate equivalent of "probably not." There will be others—I sincerely hope not very many. Keeping them out will take some doing. In the past, whatever the rigor insisted upon at the working and drafting level, who was there to tell a General Smith or a Mr. Dulles, as he presided over the IAC or USIB, that the revision he had just written out on a piece of yellow paper was not permissible?

Consistency in Usage

From my remarks about the poets, it should be clear that my sympathies lie with their mathematical opponents. But we mathematically-inclined are ourselves not in good array. You might almost say that some of us are talking in the decimal, others in the binary, and still others in the root five or seven systems.

For example, consider the letter-number device which has been standard with attaché and other reporting services, A-2, C-3, F-6, etc. The numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 designating the quality of a report's content stand for, respectively: (1) confirmed by other independent or reliable sources; (2) probably true; (3) *possibly true*; (4) doubtful; (5) probably false; and (6) cannot be judged. Note that the

¹⁴ "We anticipate," used regrettably as a synonym for "we expect," is also part way in. I hope it gets out.

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number 3, "possibly true," is in the middle of the scale of odds, doing the duty I have hoped it should never be asked to do.

Or consider the findings of a distinguished intelligence research project. The object was to identify certain military units with respect to the chances of their existence or non-existence. One group of units was called "firm," another "highly probable," a third "probable," and a fourth general group "possible." Except for one important thing, this kind of ordering was wholly to my taste. The word "firm" was unfortunately not used, as one might expect, to describe a condition of 100 percent certainty. Its begetters, upon cross-examination, owned that it was meant to indicate something like 90-95 percent—roughly the equivalent of my "almost certain." This usage puts the lower categories slightly askew from the terminology of my chart—"highly probable" equating to my "probable" and "probable" to my "chances better than even." "Possible," however, was used exactly as I have felt it should be used, to designate something in the range of chances between the absolute barriers of "certainty" and "impossibility" to which no numerical odds could be assigned.

There are other heresies among the mathematicians, if they can be so proclaimed. For example, look at the way in which photo-interpreters have defined their key evaluative words:

Suspect—Evidence is insufficient to permit designation of a function with any degree of certainty, but photography or other information provides some indications of what the function may be.

Possible—Evidence indicates that the designated function is reasonable and more likely than other functions considered.

Probable—Evidence for the designated function is strong and other functions appear quite doubtful.

This kind of formulation shows that someone—probably a number of people—had spent a good amount of time striving for a set of rigorous definitions. If you pause long enough to realize that the photo-interpreter's first problem is identification and then take a hard look at his word "suspect," you will see that it parallels my usage for "possible." But the P/Is have preempted "possible" for other duty. Their "possible" fits nicely into the slot of "probable" in my scale of values, and their "probable" into my "almost certain."

We are in disarray.

To Estimate or Not

The green language of ordinary conversation abounds with estimates given lightly and with a high order of confidence: "You're a shoo-in,"

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"Not a Chinaman's chance," "A million to one." When you hear one of these expressions or read its more decorous counterpart you may realize that the matter at issue and the related judgment required little soul-searching on the part of the estimator. In the intelligence business, too, there are many occasions when the obscurities of the unknown are easily pierced and we can launch an estimative "probably" or an "almost certainly not" with speed and conviction.

There are, however, estimates at the other end of the spectrum—estimates which are patently impossible to make. The green language is equally rich in coping with these: "Search me," "I wouldn't have the foggiest," "Your guess is as good as mine," and so on.

It is unfortunate that intelligence estimators are not allowed this kind of freedom in brushing off requests for estimates of the totally impenetrable. Some way or another a convention has been established by which we may not write the sentence: "It is impossible to estimate such and such." If we try this maneuver our masters will often rudely ask, "Why can't you; what are you paid for, anyway?" If they do not bludgeon us thus, they employ a combination of blackmail and flattery before which even the most righteous among us are likely to fall. The play goes like this: "You say you cannot estimate the number, type, and performance characteristics of Chinese Communist long-range missiles for mid-1970. This is data which is absolutely essential for my planning. Obviously no one expects you to be wholly accurate or very confident of your findings. But you people are after all the experts, and it would be too bad if I had to go to others for this stuff who know far less about it than you. And that is exactly what I will do if you refuse my request."

At this point we do not invite our would-be consumer to seek out his own crystal ball team. We accept his charge, but with grave reservations. Sometimes we try to stay honest by introducing contingencies. "This will probably continue to be the case but only if . . . , if . . . , and if . . ." Then without closing out the contingencies with firm estimates (which we are plainly unable to make) we merely talk about the "ifs," hoping that he will keep them in mind as time unfolds and that when sufficient returns are in he will himself make the estimate or ask us to have a second look.

At other times again, when it is the whole subject rather than one of its parts that cannot be estimated, we meet the impossible frontally. We scrupulously avoid the word "estimate" in describing the document and its findings. Rather, we proclaim these to be intelligence assumptions for planning. In our opening paragraphs we are likely

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to be quite specific as to where our evidence begins and ends, how we are speculating about quantities of things that the other man may produce without knowing whether he has yet made the decision to produce so many as one. We acknowledge our use of the crutch of U.S. analogy, and so on. We promise to speak, not in discrete figures, but in ranges of figures and ranges of our uncertainty regarding them.

Some years back we were obliged by *force majeure* to compose some tables setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn family of weapons. There were of course the appropriate passages of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were overprinted in red, "This table is based on assumptions stated in. . . . Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without inclusion, *in full*, of the cautionary material in. . . ." More recently we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome *caveat* but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new departures.

The Lurking Weasel

Unhappily, making the easy estimate is not the commonplace of our trade; making the impossible one is happily equally rare. What is the commonplace is the difficult but not impossible estimate. And how we, along with all humanity, hate the task! How fertile the human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment of decision! How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-ducking! "I have a sneaker that . . .," "I'd drop dead of surprise if . . ."—expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have before you become possessed of a sneaker; how much of the unexpected does it take to cause your heart to fail?

Even the well-disciplined intelligence brotherhood similarly quails before the difficult but not impossible estimate and all too often resorts to an expression of avoidance drawn from a more elegant lexicon. What we consciously or subconsciously seek is an expression which conveys a definite meaning but at the same time either absolves us completely of the responsibility or makes the estimate at enough removes from ourselves as not to implicate us. The "serious [or distinct] possibility" clan of expressions is a case in point.

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Words of Probability

Look at our use of "apparently" and "seemingly" and the verbal "appears" and "seems." We, the writers, are not the unique beings to whom such and such "appears" or "seems" to be the case; with these words we have become everybody or nobody at all. So also with "suggests" and "indicates." Perhaps the "to us" is implicit, but we do not so state; and far more importantly, we practically never say why our suggestibilities were aroused or assess the weight of the reason that aroused them. So still again with "presumably," "ostensibly," and—most serious of all—"reportedly" otherwise unmodified. The latter taken literally and by itself carries no evaluative weight whatsoever, and who should know this better than we ourselves who each day handle scores of "reports" whose credibility runs up and down the scale between almost certain truth and almost certain nonsense. It is a pleasure to report—authoritatively—that you will find very few unmodified "reportedlys" in the NIEs.

We say "the Soviets probably *fear* that such and such action will cause thus and so." What I think we mean is "The Soviets probably estimate that if they do such and such the reaction will be disadvantageous to them." If we say "they probably *hope* . . ." we mean roughly the opposite. We talk of another country's willingness "to risk such and such." This is a shorthand, and probably an unconscious one, for the country's having estimated the odds against the unwanted thing's happening as well as how unacceptable the unwanted thing would be if it occurred. Its "risking the danger" removes the critical judgment a step or two from our personal responsibility.

Words and expressions like these are far too much a part of us and our habits of communication to be banned by fiat. No matter what is said of their impreciseness or of the timidity of soul that attends their use, they will continue to play an important part in written expression. If use them we must in NIEs, let us try to use them sparingly and in places where they are least likely to obscure the thrust of our key estimative passages.

Here may I return to the group to which I have especially addressed the foregoing—the brotherhood of the NIE. Let us meet these key estimates head on. Let us isolate and seize upon exactly the thing that needs estimating. Let us endeavor to make clear to the reader that the passage in question is of critical importance—the gut estimate, as we call it among ourselves. Let us talk of it in terms of odds or chances, and when we have made our best judgment let us assign it a word or phrase that is chosen from one of the five rough categories of

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Words of Probability

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likelihood on the chart. Let the judgment be unmistakable and let it be unmistakably ours.

If the matter is important and cannot be assigned an order of likelihood, but is plainly something which is neither certain to come about nor impossible, let us use the word "possible" or one of its stand-ins—and with no modifier.

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TOP SECRET

16 June 1972

DCI CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING

MONITORING THE SALT AGREEMENTS

I. Mr. Chairman, I would like to discuss now the role of the Intelligence Community in monitoring the strategic arms limitations agreements signed in Moscow on May 26.

A. I will cover briefly the provisions of the agreements which we must monitor, and the means by which we will do this.

B. Let me repeat my earlier remarks about the extremely sensitive aspects of our intelligence sources and methods. I ask your assistance in helping me to protect the secrecy of these vital intelligence collection systems.

II. Role of Intelligence in Strategic Arms Limitations

The Intelligence Community has two major roles in the matter of strategic arms limitations.

A. First, we have been responsible for defining and assessing the size and capabilities of Soviet strategic forces, including those limited by the agreements.

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- B. Secondly, we are responsible for monitoring Soviet compliance with the agreements.

Problems of Monitoring

III. One of the key roadblocks to arms control in the past has been finding effective ways of making sure, on a continuing basis, that the terms are not being violated.

- A. Clearly, one way to do this would be to inspect suspicious activities on the ground. Unfortunately, this method cannot be used, because the Soviets have firmly rejected the kind of on-site inspection we would regard as useful.
- B. As a result, agreements such as those now concluded have had to await the development, over the past 15 years or so, of reliable technical systems by which each side can regularly inspect the territory of the other from the outside.
- C. One of the most important of these technical systems is satellite reconnaissance. This is an area in which we have always trod carefully, even though almost everyone

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Summation

XII. In sum, Mr. Chairman, monitoring the strategic arms limitation agreements does not pose any new problems for the Intelligence Community. Basically, it requires that we ensure systematic collection and analysis of information on SALT related forces. We have been preparing for such a situation for some time.

I am confident that we can accumulate the evidence and accomplish the analysis that would provide timely warning of a significant violation of the agreements signed in Moscow on May 26.

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Attachment

USIB-D-27.5/3

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

19 May 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Provisional USIB Steering Group on
Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations

1. The time is clearly at hand when we must consider the implications for the intelligence community of agreement with the USSR on strategic arms limitations. If agreements are reached, we will have a number of new responsibilities: for monitoring Soviet activities in the areas covered; for investigating and reporting on possible Soviet violations or other developments which might warrant challenge or enquiry; for assessing how much might be revealed to the USSR in such a proceeding without unduly jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods. I will probably also be asked to submit periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance.

2. Much of the task can be handled adequately with established intelligence procedures. In addition, however, I think it essential that I have--and be clearly seen to have--a specific mechanism to assist me in carrying out my monitoring responsibilities and in mobilizing the intelligence community's collection and analytical resources when problems arise.

3. To this end I propose to establish--provisionally, pending actual achievement of an agreement--a USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations under the chairmanship of General Walters. Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter and the desirability of keeping our staffing arrangements as uncomplicated as possible, I propose to limit membership in the Steering Group to General Bennett for DIA, Dr. Cline for State, and Dr. Proctor

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Attachment

USIB-D-27.5/3

for CIA. The Steering Group would be expected to call on other USIB committees and intelligence community components for assistance as necessary to insure that the full resources of the community are brought to bear on the monitoring problem.



Richard Helms
Chairman

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Attachment

USIB-D-27.5/5

27 June 1972

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR USIB STEERING GROUP ON
MONITORING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

1. The USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations (hereafter referred to as the SALT Steering Group) will be chaired by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, with the following members: the Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
2. The SALT Steering Group will be responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence for guidance to and supervision of all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.
3. Specifically the responsibilities of the SALT Steering Group include (but are not limited to) the following:
 - a. the review of relevant schedules and procedures for monitoring;
 - b. the evaluation of the effectiveness of intelligence coverage and analysis for monitoring;
 - c. the preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance;
 - d. the investigation of possible treaty violations or other anomalies;
 - e. the preparation of intelligence materials for possible use in discussions with Soviet representatives in the Standing Consultative Commission;
 - f. the preparation of recommendations for the Director of Central Intelligence.

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USIB-D-27.5/5
27 June 1972
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4. The SALT Steering Group will function primarily as a supervisory rather than an operating entity and will make maximum use of existing community assets and procedures to carry out its work expeditiously. To this end, it may task existing USIB committees or establish such working groups as the Chairman deems necessary. With respect to those intelligence ~~community components over which Steering Group members do not already have~~ command authority, the Steering Group is authorized to levy requirements and assign priorities as necessary, in coordination with the head of the component concerned.

5. The Central Intelligence Agency will provide the secretariat for the Chairman.

6. Should unreconcilable differences on important matters of procedure or substance arise within the SALT Steering Group, they will be referred to the Director of Central Intelligence for decision. Unreconcilable differences on important matters of substance will be clearly set forth and identified as to origin in any report forwarded by the SALT Steering Group.

7. The SALT Steering Group will report to the Director of Central Intelligence and, through him, to the NSC and other designated officials concerned with the monitoring problem. The State and DIA members of the SALT Steering Group (and their representatives) will continue to support their respective departmental representatives in the Executive Branch coordination process.

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17 January 1973

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OBJECTIVES

DCI OBJECTIVE: Provide measurably high quality intelligence support to SALT, MBFR and disarmament negotiations, and NSSM's assigned to CIA.

RELATED DDI OBJECTIVES:

1. To search and report on photographic coverage of all SALT-related reconnaissance targets within 60 days of the film's receipt at NPIC. NPIC

2. To evaluate, collate, and analyze on a timely basis information on Soviet compliance and to produce intelligence reports on this subject. OSR

3. To provide evaluated and collated intelligence analysis on further SALT, MBFR or disarmament negotiations in response to needs of the appropriate National Security Council staff organizations and the U.S. negotiating teams. OSR
OER
OCI

4. To man a SALT Support Team to provide intelligence liaison and background support to the U.S. negotiating teams. ODDI

5. To provide intelligence support of NSSM's assigned to CIA. OSR
OER
OCI
IRS

DCI OBJECTIVE: Provide timely and reliable analysis of the USSR's and China's strategic strength including its military, political and economic sectors.

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IAS - 98/72
20 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology


SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Organization for SALT

1. Attached is my report on this subject, written at the DDI's request. It draws heavily on previous work done by others, notably OSR and the DDI-DDS&T SALT Support Team. I have touched base with a few people in the course of thinking about it, but the report and recommendations are solely my responsibility.

2. There are five parts to the report:

- I. Roles of Intelligence Relevant to SALT.
- II. Previously-Established Tasks and Mechanisms
- III. Newly-Identified Tasks and Mechanisms
- IV. Desiderata for the Future
- V. Specific Future Needs and Recommendations

3. For your convenience, at Annex are excerpts on the Standing Consultative Commission from the texts of the SALT agreements, the DCI's recent letter establishing an intelligence community SALT Steering Group, and a draft terms of reference for the SALT Steering Group.


HOWARD STOERTZ, JR.
Senior CIA Representative
SALT III-VII

Attachment:
Report as stated

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20 June 1972

SUBJECT: Intelligence Community Organization for SALT

I. Roles of Intelligence Relevant to SALT

- A. In the three years of preparation and negotiation leading to the SALT agreements signed on 26 May 1972, CIA and the intelligence community have been responsible for:
 1. Assessing the size, capabilities, and future potential of the Soviet strategic forces to be limited by the agreements.
 2. Insuring that intelligence collection and analysis capabilities are adequate to monitor Soviet strategic forces, and identifying what sort of treaty provisions we can and cannot monitor with confidence.
 3. Providing timely, responsive support to policy-making agencies and officials in the process of developing US positions and negotiating the agreements.
- B. In the forthcoming period of living with the agreements and conducting follow-on negotiations, intelligence will continue to have the above responsibilities, and in addition will be responsible for:
 1. Monitoring Soviet compliance with the agreements and reporting the results to policy-making officials.
 2. Providing intelligence support to the US members of the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission.
 3. Preparing intelligence information which may be needed by the US side in the Standing Consultative Commission, and determining the releasability of such information if the occasion arises to raise questions with the USSR side.

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